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 Reply to Professor Bowman’s “Loss” 
Revisited 
Daniel S. Guarnera* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
No one has contributed more to our understanding of the history, opera-
tion, theory, and pathologies of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for economic 
crimes than Professor Frank Bowman.  In addition to his extensive body of 
scholarship on these topics, Professor Bowman helped design the modern eco-
nomic crime Guidelines and has remained a vocal advocate for more rational 
and just sentencing policies.1  I have learned a great deal from his work, and I 
draw from it extensively in my 2016 Missouri Law Review article, A Fatally 
Flawed Proxy: The Role of “Intended Loss” in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
for Fraud.2 
Based on Professor Bowman’s response article, “Loss” Revisited: A De-
fense of the Centerpiece of the Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Guide-
line,3 I am gratified to find that he and I share much common ground.  In fact, 
I believe our respective positions are closer in many ways than his article sug-
gests.  I will use this Response primarily to clarify what I see as the key areas 
of disagreement about the proper role of loss – and, particularly, intended loss 
– in the economic crime Guidelines.  I will then offer a few brief comments 
about possible directions for reform. 
II.  THE MENTAL STATE BEHIND INTENDED LOSS 
In general, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are a list of instructions that 
allow judges to compute recommended sentences based on particular facts 
about the offender or offense.4  If the sentencing judge finds that one of the 
facts identified in the Guidelines is present, he or she applies a predetermined  
* Associate at Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC.  My thanks to the 
editors of the Missouri Law Review for their extremely helpful comments on both this 
Article and its predecessor.  Thank you also to the many professors and colleagues who 
provided feedback on this project. 
 1. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Comment on Proposed Amendments to Eco-
nomic Crime Guideline, § 2B1.1, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 4 (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-
meetings/20150312/Bowman.pdf. 
 2. Daniel S. Guarnera, A Fatally Flawed Proxy: The Role of “Intended Loss” in 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud, 81 MO. L. REV. 715 (2016). 
 3. Frank O. Bowman, III, “Loss” Revisited: A Defense of the Centerpiece of the 
Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Guideline, 82 MO. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 4. For an overview of how the Guidelines function, see Guarnera, supra note 2, 
at 724–26. 
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sentencing enhancement; by design, the Guidelines limit judicial discretion.5  
The Guidelines can fairly be described as rule-oriented as opposed to standard-
oriented,6 with rules defined as legal directives that “bind[] a decisionmaker to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts,” 
whereas standards “collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of 
the background principle or policy to a fact situation.”7  The rule-driven struc-
ture of the Guidelines is a means of maximizing uniformity (and minimizing 
disparities) between like offenders, while simultaneously respecting the prin-
ciple that punishments should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime.8 
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines prescribes sentences for economic crimes 
such as fraud, theft, embezzlement, and property destruction, and it is one of 
the most frequently applied provisions in the Guidelines.9  Under Section 
2B1.1, the most important sentencing factor is the amount of pecuniary harm 
– loss – associated with the offense, with higher loss amounts yielding longer 
sentencing enhancements.10  The weight given to the loss calculation has been 
a longstanding criticism of Section 2B1.1,11 and it is one of the main reasons 
 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (describing the “Application Instructions” for calculating a sentence 
under the Guidelines). 
 6. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 723–24; see generally Russell D. Covey, Rules, 
Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 447 (2016); Jacob 
Schuman, Sentencing Rules and Standards: How We Decide Criminal Punishment, 83 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 7. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22, 58 (1992). 
 8. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (noting that “[t]here is a tension . . . between the mandate of uniformity 
and the mandate of proportionality”).  The Guidelines’ emphasis on uniform sentencing 
outcomes raises the question, “Uniform with respect to what?”  The answer, somewhat 
tautologically, is that the Guidelines only promote uniformity with respect to those facts 
identified in the Guidelines.  To the extent that a given Guideline fails to account for a 
factor relevant to sentencing, resulting sentences will not be uniform along that dimen-
sion (unless it is closely correlated with a proxy metric that is incorporated in the Guide-
lines).  The loss calculation plays such a broad and multifaceted role in economic crime 
sentencing – serving as the primary proxy for, at minimum, actual harm and culpability 
– that it is not surprising that loss is at the heart of debates about whether Section 2B1.1 
accounts for the relevant set of sentencing considerations. 
 9. See Id. §2B1.1; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.17 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS] (showing that, in 
fiscal year 2014, 12.1% of all federal offenders were sentenced under Section 2B1.1). 
 10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (adding up to thirty offense levels based on the loss amount).  The 
Guidelines for economic crimes are found in Section 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 11. See, e.g., Jillian Hewitt, Note, Fifty Shades of Gray: Sentencing Trends in Ma-
jor White-Collar Cases, 125 YALE L.J. 1018, 1025 (2016) (“The Commission should 
reduce the severity of the loss table and define loss to cover only actual, as opposed to 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/6
2017] REPLY TO PROFESSOR BOWMAN 35 
that judges are more likely to issue below-Guidelines sentences for economic 
crimes than almost any other type of offense.12 
For the purposes of calculating sentences under Section 2B1.1, loss is de-
fined as the greater of the loss actually inflicted by the defendant and the loss 
that he or she intended to inflict.13  As I have argued, actual loss serves primar-
ily (though not exclusively) as a proxy for the harm inflicted by a crime, and 
intended loss serves primarily (though not exclusively) as a proxy for the de-
fendant’s culpability,14 defined in this context as “[m]oral blameworthiness.”15  
From 2001 until late 2015, the Guidelines defined intended loss merely as “the 
pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense.”16  As some courts 
noted, this definition was “seriously circular”17 and “assumes that we already 
know what the word intended means.”18  This was especially problematic given 
that “[t]he meaning of the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has always been 
rather obscure.”19 
In November 2015, the U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted an amend-
ment redefining intended loss as “the pecuniary harm that the defendant pur-
posely sought to inflict.”20  Professor Bowman explains the Commission’s rea-
soning as follows: “[T]he 2015 amendment was intended by the Commission 
to reaffirm the original meaning of the 2001 definition, to wit, intended loss 
 
intended, financial losses.”); Wes Reber Porter, Federal Judges Need Competing In-
formation to Rival the Misleading Guidelines at Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT. REP. 28, 30 
(2013) (“The Guidelines have always valued formulas, even unjustified formulas, over 
individuals and individual circumstances . . . .  Section 2B1.1, the fraud guideline, pos-
sibly ranks as the most stark example.”) (footnote omitted); David Debold & Matthew 
Benjamin, “Losing Ground” – In Search of a Remedy for the Overemphasis on Loss 
and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud and Theft, 160 
U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 141 (2011) (“Judges, defense lawyers, and com-
mentators have long called for a reassessment of § 2B1.1’s inordinate emphasis on the 
amount of loss caused by an offense.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ellen S. Podgor, 
The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 756 
(2007) (“Culpability is basically non-existent as a sentencing concern, with the punish-
ment resting on a numerical figure that correlates with the amount of loss occurring as 
a result of the crime.”). 
 12. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 9, at tbl.27A (showing that defendants convicted of fraud were 
given below-Guidelines sentences 28.3% of the time). 
 13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 14. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 737–41. 
 15. Culpability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 17. United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 18. United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 19. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (5th ed. 2010). 
 20. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (emphasis added). 
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embraces only those pecuniary harms the defendant subjectively desired to oc-
cur, and to squelch a small, but troublesome, strain of case law that risked mud-
dying the waters.”21  I agree with Professor Bowman that the purposeful loss 
amendment was designed to reject the “objectivist” position.22  This position 
was taken most prominently by the First Circuit, which held that intended loss 
equaled “the loss that a person standing in the defendant’s shoes reasonably 
would have expected to cause at the time he perpetrated the fraud.”23  Moreo-
ver, I think that the amendment succeeds in clarifying that a subjective inquiry 
is required. 
Whether the purposeful loss amendment materially changed the prevail-
ing definition of intended loss – and whether such a change is beneficial as a 
policy matter – depends on what the former definition was.  Professor Bowman 
characterizes intended loss as “embrac[ing] only those pecuniary harms the de-
fendant subjectively desired to occur,” and thus he concludes that the amend-
ment’s use of the word “purpose” does not constitute any change in meaning.24  
I certainly agree that there is little daylight between “desire” and “purpose.”  
This is true not only in ordinary usage,25 but also in the more technical defini-
tion that “purpose” generally carries in criminal law.26  The Model Penal Code 
(“MPC”), which has heavily influenced the terminology used to delineate men-
tal states, holds that a person “purposes” a result if “it is his conscious object 
to . . . cause such a result.”27  Even though neither Congress nor the Commis-
sion has formally adopted the MPC, the Supreme Court has recognized and 
applied this definition of purpose on numerous occasions.28  For these reasons, 
 
 21. Bowman, supra note 3, at 19. 
 22. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 
25791 (notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015) (explaining that 
an amendment to the Guidelines is necessary because “courts have expressed some 
disagreement as to whether a subjective or objective inquiry is required,” and endorsing 
the subjective approach). 
 23. United States v. Iwuala, 789 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 24. Bowman, supra note 3, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 25. Purpose, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) 
(“[S]omething set up as an object or end to be attained.”); Desire, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) (“[C]onscious impulse toward 
something that promises . . . satisfaction in its attainment.”). 
 26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962); see also Purpose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An objective, 
goal, or end.”). 
 27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962) (emphasis added). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (“As we pointed 
out in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978), a person 
who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if ‘he consciously desires that 
result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct,’ while he is 
said to act knowingly if he is aware ‘that that result is practically certain to follow from 
his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.’”). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/6
2017] REPLY TO PROFESSOR BOWMAN 37 
I would agree that if courts construed intended loss as “desired” or “purpose-
ful” loss prior to the 2015 amendment, the amendment’s introduction of the 
word “purpose” would merely codify that pre-existing interpretation. 
I do not think, however, that the courts typically restricted intended loss 
to the pecuniary harm that a defendant desired – nor should they have.  Take, 
for example, the Second Circuit case of United States v. Confredo, which both 
Professor Bowman and I reference.29  Confredo helped his clients apply for 
fraudulent loans, but he did not stand to benefit from their subsequent de-
faults.30  Thus, his assistance in the fraudulent loan scheme was attenuated from 
the lenders’ losses; Confredo was, at worst, indifferent as to whether or not his 
clients repaid their loans.  As one court explained in an analogous case, if “in-
tent must include an element of purpose or desire[,] . . . then [the defendant] 
would have a good argument that he intended no loss, because the evidence 
does not suggest that he desired anyone to lose money or even that his purpose 
was that the lenders lose money.”31  In other words, Confredo’s purposeful loss 
was $0. 
But the Second Circuit did not apply such a narrow definition of intended 
loss.  Instead, it held – quite sensibly, in my view – that “[i]ntended loss refers 
to the defendant’s subjective expectation.”32  For example, the court explained 
that a defendant who helped others apply for $1 million in loans, anticipating 
that $250,000 would be repaid, only intended (i.e., subjectively expected) a 
loss of $750,000.33  Other courts have defined intended loss similarly.34  Be-
cause it is blameworthy to act with the expectation that one’s actions will inflict 
 
 29. See Bowman, supra note 3, at 24–25; Guarnera, supra note 2, at 752–53. 
 30. United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 31. United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 32. Confredo, 528 F.3d at 152 (quoting United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 
460 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 33. Id.  Importantly, under this formulation, loss does not equal every dollar placed 
at risk; rather, the expected loss calculation should attempt, at least conceptually, to 
replicate the expected value formula: [likelihood of outcome(s)] * [expected out-
come(s)].  For example, a scheme that the defendant believed had a 10% chance of 
failing to inflict any loss, a 45% chance of inflicting a $1 million loss, and a 45% chance 
of inflicting a $2 million loss would have an expected loss of [10% * $0 + 45% * 
$1,000,000 + 45% * $2,000,000] = $1,350,000.  Of course, any estimate of loss need 
only be “reasonable,” see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016), and the feasible degree of precision will vary case 
to case (as it does now). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e 
look to the ‘defendant’s subjective expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he may 
have exposed his victims.’” (quoting Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 460)); see also United States 
v. Harris, 597 F.3d 242, 255 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A rule that prohibited sentencing courts 
from inferring intent from a defendant’s recklessness would approach effectively cre-
ating a defense capable of eviscerating the ‘intended loss’ provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines for any criminal who managed to insulate his crime from the ultimate in-
fliction of loss.”). 
5
Guarnera: Reply to Professor Bowman’s “Loss”
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
38 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
harm on others – even if it is not one’s purpose to do so – I believe that sub-
jectively expected loss is the optimal loss-based metric for grading defendants 
by culpability.35 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the definition of “intent” is “am-
biguous and elastic,”36 and this ambiguity enabled courts such as the Second 
Circuit in Confredo to calculate, when necessary, unrealized losses that the de-
fendant did not desire but nonetheless subjectively expected would occur.  In 
most fact patterns, the distinction between purposed and subjectively expected 
losses will not matter;37 for example, if defendants undertake a scheme that 
involves a transfer of property directly from a victim to themselves, they will 
generally have the purpose of inflicting a loss equal to the loss that they sub-
jectively expect to occur.  But there are numerous offenses, similar to the loan 
fraud at issue in Confredo, for which the victim’s losses are attenuated from 
the defendant’s crime.  Such crimes might include, for example, contracting 
frauds, crimes involving the sale of stolen checks or credit cards to third parties 
for flat fees, and accounting or financial reporting frauds committed for the 
 
 35. In my previous article, I analogized subjectively expected loss to the MPC’s 
definition of recklessness.  See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 755–56; MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A person acts recklessly 
with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his 
conduct.”).  The point of the analogy was to emphasize that subjectively expected loss 
is relevant to the culpability inquiry because it is blameworthy to act in the face of a 
known and significant risk of harm, even if no loss is “purposed.”  See Larry Alexander, 
Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
931, 931 (2000) (arguing that “the basic moral vice of insufficient concern for the in-
terests of others” is the sine qua non of all criminal culpability).  In drawing this con-
nection, however, I did not mean to imply that the loss calculation should equal the 
total amount of money placed at risk by the criminal scheme (e.g., in Confredo’s case, 
the total face value of all his clients’ loans).  Cf. Bowman, supra note 3, at 25–26.  Such 
an approach would overestimate culpability by ignoring the defendant’s own under-
standing of his or her actions, and it would result in a defendant like Confredo having 
the same loss calculation as a thief who simply stole an amount equal to the face value 
of all of Confredo’s loans. 
 36. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980); see also LAFAVE, supra 
note 19, § 5.2(b) (“[T]he word ‘intent’ in the substantive criminal law has traditionally 
not been limited to the narrow, dictionary definition of purpose, aim, or design, but 
instead has often been viewed as encompassing much of what would ordinarily be de-
scribed as knowledge.”). 
 37. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404–05 (“In the case of most crimes, ‘the limited dis-
tinction between knowledge and purpose has not been considered important, since there 
is good reason for imposing liability whether the defendant desired or merely knew of 
the practical certainty of the result[s].’ . . . In certain narrow classes of crimes, however, 
heightened culpability has been thought to merit special attention.” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 
(1978))). 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/6
2017] REPLY TO PROFESSOR BOWMAN 39 
benefit of one’s employer.38  Often, these defendants will not have “purposed” 
any loss at all. 
If a defendant such as Confredo had a purposeful loss of $0, then the loss 
calculation is based exclusively on the actual loss amount.39  Professor Bow-
man is correct to point out that there is a correlation between actual loss and 
culpability – a scheme that actually imposes large losses is often more blame-
worthy than one that imposes small losses.40  But actual loss is an even weaker 
proxy for culpability than intended loss.  For example, (1) actual loss includes 
losses that the defendant never subjectively envisioned, so long as they were 
foreseeable to an objectively reasonable person;41 (2) actual loss can fluctuate 
wildly based on the defendant’s “moral luck” (i.e., because of factors unrelated 
to the defendant’s subjective intentions, such as how quickly he or she was 
apprehended);42 and (3) as with any loss measure, actual loss excludes a wide 
range of factors traditionally relevant to culpability, such as motive, the dura-
tion of the offense, contrition, the defendant’s role in the offense, and nonpecu-
niary harms. 
 
 38. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 752. 
 39. Id. at 753–54. 
 40. See Bowman, supra note 3, at 28. 
 41. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).  Professor Bowman defends actual loss as a proxy for 
culpability despite the fact that actual loss includes all reasonably foreseeable losses, 
including those not subjectively anticipated by the defendant.  See Bowman, supra note 
3, at 12–16.  He points out that some criminal law doctrines – like the felony murder 
rule and coconspirator liability – treat foreseeable-but-unintended harms as equivalent 
to intended harms.  Id. at 10.  Whether such rules are desirable in the context of creating 
liability is a hotly contested issue.  See, e.g., GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 10 
(2012) (“Legal scholars are almost unanimous in condemning [the felony murder rule] 
as a morally indefensible form of strict liability.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt., at 
307 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (arguing that law “lose[s] all sense 
of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [coconspirator is] held 
accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely unaware 
and which he did not influence at all.”).  But even if liability should sometimes be 
imposed in such cases, the distinction between intended and unintended harms would 
still be of paramount relevance when distinguishing between defendants at sentencing.  
For example, while a bank robber who accidentally runs over a pedestrian during his 
getaway has committed felony murder, he is less morally blameworthy than a cold-
blooded assassin.  That distinction should be reflected in their sentences.  In the same 
way, defendants who caused losses unintentionally will generally be less culpable, and 
thus deserve lighter sentences, than those who inflicted losses intentionally. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“To a considerable extent, the amount of loss caused by this crime is a kind of 
accident, dependent as much on the diligence of the victim’s security procedures as on 
[the defendant’s] cupidity.  Had [the defendant] been caught sooner, he would have 
stolen less money; had he not been caught until later, he would surely have stolen 
more.”). 
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Professor Bowman agrees that something like subjectively expected loss 
should fall within the scope of intended loss; he writes that “to say that a de-
fendant ‘expected’ a loss at the time of his crime is [] to assert that he con-
sciously contemplated that result, concluded that it was highly probable, and 
chose to offend anyway.”43  He continues, “[F]rom both a moral and eviden-
tiary perspective, [expecting a loss is] so nearly indistinguishable from desiring 
the loss as to fit seamlessly into any workaday definition of ‘intended loss.’”44 
It is regrettable that the 2015 amendment did not expressly define the in-
tended loss in terms of subjectively expected loss.45  Professor Bowman says 
this is “split[ting] definitional hairs.”46  Perhaps, but the distinction still has 
significance, especially in cases like Confredo, where desires and expectations 
do not align.47  I worry – along with the Department of Justice48 – that the 
 
 43. Bowman, supra note 3, at 22. 
 44. Id.  Elsewhere, Professor Bowman writes, “It is one thing to increase punish-
ment, even in the absence of harm, for harboring the most serious class of culpable 
mental state – purpose to cause a specified harm – but quite another to increase punish-
ment in the absence of harm, based purely on a far less serious class of culpable mental 
state – acting with the knowledge that one’s conduct creates risk.”  Id. at 23.  But once 
criminal liability has already been established, I see nothing objectionable about using 
the losses that defendants subjectively expected to result from their crimes as a metric 
on which to grade their culpability. 
 45. There is a potential ambiguity in the use of subjectively expected loss: would 
a defendant who purposed (i.e., desired) a huge loss, but who did not expect the plan to 
succeed, be punished based on the large purposed loss or the smaller expected loss?  
One option would be to say that when a defendant purposes that a loss occur, the pur-
posed loss amount takes priority over the expected loss.  Alternatively, subjectively 
expected loss could supplant the purposeful loss inquiry across the board.  Since the 
large majority of defendants expect their plans to succeed, relatively few defendants 
will have different purposed and expected loss calculations, and culpability is arguably 
better measured by the results that the defendants expected to flow from their actions 
than their fanciful desires. 
 46. Bowman, supra note 3, at 22. 
 47. On questions of criminal liability, courts rarely dismiss questions about the 
appropriate mens rea standard as mere hair-splitting.  See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (discussing which of the MPC’s four-tier hierarchy of 
mental states should attach to a statute silent as to mens rea); id. at 2014 (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).  Sentencing decisions are not as binary 
as guilty/not guilty, but it is nonetheless important to ensure that judges are calculating 
intended loss consistently so that all federal defendants are sentenced by the same 
standards. 
 48. U.S. Department of Justice Views on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and Issues for Comment Published by the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission in the Federal Register on January 16, 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 28–29 (Mar. 9, 
2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hear-
ings-and-meetings/20150312/DOJ.pdf (arguing that the purposeful loss amendment 
would “effectively eviscerate use of the intended loss criterion in determining loss.  In 
many fraud cases, defendants routinely assert, with some persuasiveness, that they 
never intended to inflict any pecuniary harm on their victims, and that they genuinely 
8
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definition of “purpose” is sufficiently clear, both in common usage and the 
criminal law, that judges will be constrained to find an intended loss of $0 when 
a victim’s losses are attenuated from the defendant’s actions.  Unlike the elastic 
term “intent,” the Supreme Court itself has called the distinction between pur-
pose and lesser mental states “[p]erhaps the most significant” distinction drawn 
by the MPC.49  The strength of the argument that “purpose” should carry its 
plain meaning is reinforced further by the Commission’s statement that “[t]he 
amendment adopts the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit” in its 2011 opinion 
United States v. Manatau,50 from which it borrowed the amendment’s “pur-
posely sought to inflict” language verbatim.51  Manatau, in turn, rigorously 
employs the full arsenal of statutory interpretation tools to argue that, even un-
der the pre-amendment definition of “intended loss,” “intent” means “purpose” 
as defined by the MPC.52 
It is, therefore, not surprising that courts and litigants have begun probing 
the effect of the 2015 purposeful loss amendment.  For example, one court has 
classified the amendment as a “substantive rather than a clarifying change,”53 
and another has recognized that “the changed language . . . stresses that the ac-
tual intent of the [defendant’s actions] must have been to ‘inflict’ monetary 
harm.”54  Litigants are pressing courts on these points as well, advancing argu-
ments that “[t]he court’s refusal to distinguish between [the defendant’s] know-
ing conduct and his subjective intent to inflict a loss diluted the mens rea re-
quirement of the intended loss enhancement,”55 and “[t]he Amendment repre-
sents a definitive shift . . . and brings intended loss down to the real world level 
of estimating the amount of money a particular defendant under particular cir-
cumstances purposefully sought to obtain; in other words, a pecuniary amount 
he realistically sought to deprive another of.”56  
believed that their victims would receive the benefits that they were originally prom-
ised”). 
 49. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980). 
 50. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25791 
(notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015). 
 51. United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 52. Id. (“We hold that ‘intended loss’ means a loss the defendant purposely sought 
to inflict.”); see generally id. at 1050–56 (advancing seven arguments in favor of that 
conclusion); see also Guarnera, supra note 2, at 747–51. 
 53. United States v. Morrison, No. MO-10-CR-135(1), 2016 WL 5886697, at *33 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2016) (holding that the 2015 amendments are substantive for the 
purpose of retroactivity analysis). 
 54. United States v. Free, No. 2:14-CR-0019, 2015 WL 8784738, at *4 n.5 (W.D. 
Pa. Dec. 15, 2015) (finding that the 2015 amendments reinforce the conclusion that the 
defendant had presented a “substantial question” in his appeal, thereby justifying his 
release from prison pending appeal). 
 55. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 29, United States v. Pollock, No. 16-30164 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 21, 2016), 2016 WL 7435920, at *29. 
 56. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Shawn McFadden at 66–67, United States v. 
Cooke, No.16-264-CR(L) (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015), 2016 WL 4944300, at *66–67; see 
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Time will tell how courts ultimately apply the purposeful loss amend-
ment.  But until this interpretive issue is definitively resolved, the amendment 
makes sentencing less predictable and increases the risk of inconsistent appli-
cation between judges, thereby undermining the very uniformity that the 
Guidelines are designed to promote. 
III.  ACCOUNTING FOR BOTH ACTUAL AND INTENDED LOSS 
There is an additional aspect of the definition of loss that demands atten-
tion: under the current formulation of loss, only the “greater of” actual and 
intended loss contributes to the final Guidelines sentence.57  Although Profes-
sor Bowman states that both “actual loss and intended loss are justifiable as 
measures of crime seriousness on somewhat different, if overlapping, 
grounds,”58 he nonetheless finds the (common) scenario in which intended loss 
is greater than actual loss “troubling.”59 
I interpret this problem a bit more expansively.60  Actual and intended 
loss are both distinct data points of relevance to sentencing.  Yet one or the 
other is always excluded from any role in determining the Guidelines sentence, 
regardless of what it might indicate about the nature of the offense.61  Addi-
tionally, by requiring judges to apply only the most punitive measure available 
in every case, the loss calculation systemically produces higher sentences than 
would be generated by any algorithm that accounted for both actual and in-
tended loss. 
As Professor Bowman points out, this problem could be addressed by dis-
counting the intended loss calculation or combining the actual and intended 
 
also Brief of Defendant-Appellant Martha Ednie at 17, United States v. Ednie, No. 16-
3825 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016), 2016 WL 7241772, at *17 (arguing that the fact that 
“borrowers obtained loans in excess of the amounts which would have been approved 
had the lenders known of the [true value of the collateral] . . . falls far short of estab-
lishing that [the defendant] acted with the conscious intent to inflict the lenders with 
virtually the entire loss of their principal balances”); Appellant’s Opening Brief at 16–
18, United States v. Dobadzhyan, No. 16-50052 (9th Cir. June 20, 2016), 2016 WL 
3521929, at *16–18 (arguing that the general rule in §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i) that calcu-
lates the intended loss per stolen “access device” at $500 must be reevaluated in light 
of the 2015 amendment). 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 58. Bowman, supra note 3, at 17. 
 59. Id. at 28. 
 60. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 741–43. 
 61. Under the Guidelines, judges can always take actual or intended loss amounts 
into account when deciding whether to issue a sentence at the top or bottom of the 
applicable Guidelines range or in some cases to justify a sentence outside the recom-
mended range.  But the high rate of departures in economic crime sentencing indicates 
that Section 2B1.1 systematically generates disproportionate sentences (requiring 
judges to disregard the advisory sentence), and the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss 
formulation is one structural contributor to this problem. 
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loss figures in some way (such as by averaging them).62  Professor Bowman 
states that he is “intrigued by the possibility of discounting intended loss,” but: 
I am leery of the practical difficulties in designing such a discount to 
make it both defensible in principle and workable in practice.  Perhaps 
the most workable approach would be non-computational.  That is, the 
intended loss rules should: (1) continue to require that sentencing courts 
calculate intended loss as they now do but (2) recommend that judges 
imposing sentences should consider that intended, but unrealized, loss 
may overstate the seriousness of the offense.63 
I share Professor Bowman’s concern that it would be very difficult to combine 
actual and intended loss in a way that consistently grades defendants based on 
the severity of their crimes.  In my view, the primary reason for this is that 
intended loss is such a narrow and unstable proxy for culpability that it is nearly 
impossible to plug it in to a sentencing formula that yields coherent results 
across defendants.64  Even if articulated as subjectively expected loss, intended 
loss would still fail to account for commonly relevant facts such as motive, 
nonpecuniary harms, the defendant’s role in the scheme, whether the defendant 
abused a position of trust, the duration of the offense, contrition, and efforts to 
mitigate the harms from the crime.  When grading defendants’ culpability, 
qualitative considerations such as these are not ancillary – they are at the core 
of what it means to say that one defendant is more (or less) blameworthy than 
another. 
 
 62. Bowman, supra note 3, at 31; see also Guarnera, supra note 2, at 742–43. 
 63. Bowman, supra note 3, at 31. 
 64. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 741–42.  Any analysis of whether a Guidelines 
provision yields the “right” sentence depends on at least two assumptions: (1) the types 
of facts relevant to assessing culpability (i.e., what makes a criminal act blameworthy?), 
and (2) the role that culpability – in comparison to other sentencing considerations – 
should play in punishment generally.  It is outside the scope of this Article to propose 
a complete taxonomy of factors related to culpability in the economic crimes context.  
My modest assertion is that whatever factors one considers relevant to ranking defend-
ants by culpability, they are broader than simply the amount of loss intended or in-
flicted.  With respect to the role of culpability in punishment generally, any assessment 
is complicated by the fact that the Commission expressly eschewed any clearly defined, 
internally consistent, philosophy of punishment.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (describing how the in-
augural Commission rejected calls to adopt either just deserts or utilitarian theories of 
punishment in favor of an “empirical approach” that, in most cases, tried to replicate 
pre-Guidelines sentences).  Once more, my position is that so long as culpability has 
some relevance to sentencing, the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss formulation is a 
very awkward and frequently faulty means of incorporating culpability assessments 
into the final sentence.  See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 742–43 (arguing that the “greater 
of actual and intended loss” excludes considerations central to just deserts theory). 
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Therefore, Professor Bowman’s suggestion that judges take a “non-com-
putational” approach and evaluate whether intended loss overestimates the se-
verity of the offense on a case-by-case basis seems promising.65  But once we 
have recognized that judges should have the discretion to decide precisely what 
effect the intended loss calculation should have on any given sentence, we have 
already taken a significant step away from the rule-driven structure of the cur-
rent Guidelines and toward a hybrid model that incorporates a standard-like 
assessment of culpability.  Given the inherent difficulties in grading defend-
ants’ culpability through the loss calculation, this approach deserves careful 
consideration. 
IV.  STANDARDS-BASED SENTENCING AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
POST-BOOKER GUIDELINES 
In my original article, I take the position that given the persistently high 
rate of sentences outside of the range prescribed by Section 2B1.1, and in light 
of the inherent limitations of the loss calculation as a proxy for (simultane-
ously) actual harm and culpability, the economic crime Guidelines provide an 
attractive test case for experimentation in standards-oriented sentencing.66  Ad-
ditionally, I argue that a hybrid model incorporating both rules and standards 
would be more consistent with contemporary sentencing doctrine, which holds 
that the Guidelines are merely advisory and judges must ultimately ensure that 
all sentences promote an array of statutory considerations.67  Professor Bow-
man “agree[s] that in the wake of [United States v.] Booker’s transformation of 
the Guidelines from strongly presumptive to purely advisory, the Sentencing 
Commission ought to reconfigure, not just Section 2B1.1, but the entire 
[G]uideline structure to take conscious account of the reality of current federal 
sentencing practice.”68  Moreover, he believes that such a reconfiguration “will 
surely be less rule-bound and more standard-like.”69  I will offer a few com-
ments about the benefits of such a system and its most important features. 
To understand why the incorporation of a standard-based sentencing en-
hancement would be a significant – but worthwhile – departure from the Guide-
lines’ current structure, it is necessary to understand how the Guidelines have 
evolved from their origins to the present day.  When the Guidelines went into 
effect in 1987, they were mandatory in most cases.70  The presence or absence 
of specified facts identified in the Guidelines generated a sentencing range, and 
with few exceptions, all that was left for the judge to do was select a sentence 
 
 65. Bowman, supra note 3, at 31. 
 66. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 760–67. 
 67. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
(2012), partially abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 68. Bowman, supra note 3, at 32. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
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within that range.71  The rule-oriented Guidelines constrained judicial discre-
tion – the perceived source of unwarranted sentencing disparities – through the 
use of sentencing factors that could be consistently applied by all judges.72  
Having decided as a policy matter that the Guidelines should maximize uni-
formity and minimize discretion, the Commission’s willingness to eschew 
qualitative considerations (like motive) in favor of readily quantifiable metrics 
(like loss) is understandable, despite their often self-evident under-inclusive-
ness. 
In 2005, however, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker that 
the mandatory nature of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.73  It 
then remedied the violation by deeming the Guidelines advisory.74  Contempo-
rary Supreme Court-mandated sentencing procedure starts with a Guidelines 
calculation and ends with the judge ensuring that the final sentence takes into 
account all the statutory sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) – 
titled “Factors to Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence” – such as whether 
the sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to promote the prin-
ciples of just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.75  At this 
last and determinative stage of sentencing, the judge “may not presume that the 
Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an individualized assessment 
based on the facts presented.”76 
Surprisingly, Booker’s foundational transformation of federal sentencing 
practice has had no discernible effect on the design of the Guidelines them-
selves.  The Guidelines’ strictly quantitative, rule-based structure has endured 
despite their reimagined role in sentencing procedure and judges’ new (or, ra-
ther, newly effectual) responsibility to evaluate sentences in light of the factors 
in § 3553(a).  This is unfortunate.  Post-Booker, a significant number of de-
fendants continue to be sentenced within the Guidelines range, which indicates 
the Guidelines’ rules work well for many crimes.77  But where the rates of out- 
 71. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1B1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (describing the process of selecting a sentence using the 
Guidelines). 
 72. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 722, 735–36. 
 73. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (holding that “[a]ny fact 
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must 
be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 74. Id. at 246. 
 75. See United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), courts are instructed to consider factors such as “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
the need for the sentence to account for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and re-
habilitation, “the kinds of sentences available,” and “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities.”  Id. 
 76. Gall, 552 U.S. at 39. 
 77. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016) (“In less 
than 20% of cases since 2007 have district courts ‘imposed above- or below-Guidelines 
sentences absent a Government motion.’” (quoting Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
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of-Guidelines sentences are persistently higher than average, and the chal-
lenges of crafting quantitative rules are especially great, the Commission 
should not tie itself to a failing formula.78 
Since the loss calculation’s ability to measure culpability is inherently 
limited, one of the most important roles for a discretion-enhancing standard 
would be to equip judges to evaluate culpability.  As I noted in my previous 
article,79 the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Reform of Federal 
Sentencing for Economic Crimes (“ABA Task Force”) recently offered a pro-
posal along these lines.80  It includes several attractive structural features that 
should be incorporated in any standards-oriented provision to grade culpability 
in Section 2B1.1.81 
First, a standards-based system should permit judges to make a direct and 
holistic determination of a defendant’s relative culpability, which would then 
be integrated into the overall structure of the Guidelines.  For example, the 
ABA Task Force’s proposal requires judges to place defendants in one of five 
tiers based on their degree of culpability, each of which carries an associated 
sentencing enhancement.82  These enhancements are then added to the others 
in Section 2B1.1 and elsewhere in the Guidelines to produce the final sen-
tence.83  In these ways, the standards-based inquiry is constrained by the oth-
erwise rule-oriented structure of the Guidelines.84 
Second, the culpability inquiry should not be unguided.  Rather, the Com-
mission should offer its unique sentencing expertise to provide a taxonomy of 
substantive factors relevant to culpability, perhaps categorized by type of of-
fense.  For example, the ABA Task Force identifies a non-exclusive list of fac-
tors relevant to culpability, such as (1) the motive/nature of the offense, (2) 
gain, (3) degree of sophistication/organization, (4) duration, (5) extenuating 
circumstances, and (6) efforts to mitigate harm.85  It then provides additional 
insight into how each of these factors might be analyzed under common fact 
patterns and offers commentary about which are typically associated with 
 
2072, 2084 (2013))); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 9, at tbl.N. 
 78. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 9, at tbl.27A (showing approximately 30% of economic crime 
sentences below the Guidelines recommendation without a government-sponsored de-
parture, second among major offense categories only to child pornography production). 
 79. See Guarnera, supra note 2, at 762–66. 
 80. JAMES E. FELMAN, 28-WTR CRIM. JUST. 31, A REPORT ON BEHALF OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES 31 (2014). 
 81. Id. at 33. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id.  The ABA Task Force’s proposal eliminates most of the sentencing 
factors currently found in Section 2B1.1, but the Commission need not necessarily fol-
low that same approach. 
 85. Id. at 32–33. 
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higher degrees of culpability.86  In appropriate cases, the Commission might 
also offer statistics about how judges across the country have sentenced simi-
larly situated defendants, or any other expertise that it can bring to bear in as-
sisting judges as they assess culpability. 
Third, the Commission should prescribe a decision-making process that 
promotes deliberation and encourages judges to give the greatest weight to the 
most relevant factors.  One of the primary ways that the ABA Task Force’s 
proposal does this is by requiring that all of the substantive factors identified 
in the proposed Guidelines be reviewed in every sentencing.87  This practice 
helps ensure that judges consider the full range of relevant factors and grade 
defendants with respect to the entire spectrum of offenders.88  Such an approach 
is analogous to “structured professional judgment” assessments, which have 
become widely used in fields such as medicine and psychology and have shown 
the ability to significantly improve decision-making outcomes.89 
Professor Bowman raises some legitimate objections to the specifics of 
the ABA Task Force’s proposal.  One of his primary concerns is that the de-
fendant’s intended loss is not adequately accounted for.90  I strongly concur 
 
 86. See id. at 34. 
 87. Id. at 33 (“Instead, the court arrives at one of five culpability levels after con-
sidering the combined effect of all culpability factors.”). 
 88. Id. at 34. 
 89. See generally ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET 
THINGS RIGHT 48–51 (2009); Alex B. Haynes et al., A Surgical Safety Check-List to 
Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 
495–96 (2009) (finding that the use of a surgical checklist cut deaths in half); Annegret 
Borchard et al., A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness, Compliance, and Critical 
Factors for Implementation of Safety Checklists in Surgery, 256 ANNALS SURGERY 925, 
927–31 (2012) (concluding based on a meta-analysis of twenty-one studies that the use 
of check-lists in surgery cuts the rates of mortality and complications by 40%); Jerrod 
Brown & Jay P. Singh, Forensic Risk Assessment: A Beginner’s Guide, 1 ARCHIVES 
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 49, 54 (2014) (describing how, in structured professional judg-
ment assessments, empirically-driven factors “are used as an aide-memoire, guiding 
administrators in making a categorical risk judgment”); Jennifer L. Skeem & John Mo-
nahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011) (describing the effectiveness of structured professional 
judgments in predicting risk of violence in patients). 
 90. Bowman, supra note 3, at 28–29.  Professor Bowman also argues that the cul-
pability enhancement in the ABA Task Force proposal is calibrated such that it will 
rarely produce significant prison sentences for defendants who did not cause any actual 
loss.  Id. at 29 n.148.  He notes that when there is no culpability enhancement, a sen-
tence would not account for “the malignance of the defendant’s intentions, the com-
plexity of his scheme, the extent of his preparations, the proximity to success, or the 
reason for failure.”  Id. at 28–29.  But with the possible exception of the complexity of 
the scheme, those factors are not accounted for elsewhere in the current Guidelines 
either.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (enhancing sentences by two offense levels if “sophisti-
cated means” were used).  The sentences generated by the ABA Task Force’s proposal 
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that this is an oversight.  Intended loss (especially when defined as subjectively 
expected loss) is a highly relevant data point that should be expressly consid-
ered every time judges evaluate culpability – just because loss does not capture 
culpability well on its own does not mean that it should not be part of a holistic 
evaluation.91  No doubt, many other adjustments could be made to the ABA 
Task Force’s proposal, and the Commission should seek extensive input from 
the full range of stakeholders to craft standards-based provisions that are man-
ageable in scope, avoid imposing an undue burden, and are of practical use to 
judges. 
Congress has instructed the Commission to “establish sentencing policies 
and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that . . . assure the meeting 
of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2).”92  By incor-
porating difficult-to-quantify factors like culpability into the Guidelines by 
means of standards, the Guidelines themselves become more transparent, and 
judges are better equipped to evaluate whether an advisory sentencing recom-
mendation accurately captures the relevant statutory considerations.  This will, 
in the long run, give judges greater confidence that they are assessing the 
§ 3553(a) factors as Congress intended, resulting in more deliberative decision-
making at sentencing and increasing the Guidelines’ credibility in the eyes of 
judges and other actors in the criminal justice system.93 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The incorporation of a standards-based assessment of culpability into the 
economic crime Guidelines is a worthy goal, one with the promise of striking 
a better balance between uniformity and discretion, rules and standards, and 
centralized and localized decision-making.  It would, in short, further the 
Guidelines’ goals of channeling judicial discretion while offering judges the 
 
may well need further calibration.  But as a matter of design, a standards-based culpa-
bility assessment is the best way to account for qualitative factors like those Professor 
Bowman mentions. 
 91. For this reason, I disagree with some critics of the Guidelines who reject any 
role whatsoever for quantifiable measurements in the Guidelines.  See, e.g., Wes Reber 
Porter, Federal Judges Need Competing Information to Rival the Misleading Guide-
lines at Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT. REP. 28, 30 (2013) (“The federal criminal justice 
system should maintain the structure, organization, and considerations of the Guide-
lines, but do away with the distracting and misleading numbers and calculations that 
accompany the Guidelines.”). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2012). 
 93. In an advisory sentencing regime, credibility is essential to the Guidelines’ 
continued effectiveness.  See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Dis-
parities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1277 (2014) (“Judges who have no prior experience sentencing 
under the mandatory Guidelines regime are more likely to depart from the Guidelines-
recommended range than their pre-Booker counterparts, suggesting that newer judges 
are less anchored to the Guidelines.”). 
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freedom to consider all relevant facts and ensuring that the statutory obligations 
under § 3553(a) are met.  Ultimately, this type of reform would lead to more 
proportional sentences.  But it would also be a dramatic change from the rule-
oriented status quo, and one that is best implemented cautiously, one Guideline 
at a time.  Although it is relevant to sentencing, a defendant’s intended loss is 
a fatally flawed proxy for culpability writ large.  The assessment of culpability 
in the economic crime Guidelines would, therefore, be an ideal place for the 
Commission to begin experimenting with standards in sentencing. 
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